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ESSAY 
EXTENDING THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 
Carl Tobias* 
Several years ago, I admonished those who are responsible for main-
taining a uniform, simple system of federal civil procedure to amelio-
rate the increasing balkanization of that regime, a problem exacerbated 
by the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990.1 More recently, I 
urged Congress to recalibrate the legislation.2 The CJRA encouraged 
unprecedented introspection in all ninety-four federal district courts, 
leading to experimentation with procedures that were intended to re-
duce expense and delay in civil litigation. Despite my cogent sugges-
tions for extending the deadline for the CJRA's implementation, Con-
gress completely ignored that brilliant advice. By some oversight, 
Congress not only failed to call me as a witness, but also neglected to 
schedule a hearing regarding this matter.8 
I was recently vindicated, however, when Congress passed the Judi-
cial Amendments Act of 1994 and adopted concepts that were central 
to my recommendations. I had asserted that the CJRA's major pur-
poses could not be achieved in the time prescribed, threatening the leg-
islation's efficacious implementation, and thus, I proposed that Con-
gress postpone several statutory deadlines.• Congress actually 
subscribed to my ideas in the Judicial Amendments Act. A significant 
component of the new legislation extends for one year the mid-199 5 
date when the RAND Corporation, which is studying ten pilot dis-
tricts' experimentation with cost and delay reduction procedures, must 
submit its conclusions to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 11 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris 
Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.]. 1393, 1427 (1992). 
2. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 30 HARV. ]. ON 
LEGIS. 115, 127-33 (1993). 
3. Apologies again to Professor John Hart Ely. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 115 n.2. 
4. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 128-32. 
5. See Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, 108 Stat. 4345 (1994). 
Section two of the statute extends the authorization of the Judiciary Automation Fund for three 
years, while section three extends authorization for court-annexed arbitration in twenty districts 
until the end of 1997. See id. §§ 2-3. 
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Numerous compelling arguments supported congressional postpone-
ment of this deadline. Most importantly, the RAND Corporation can 
now capture much additional data, which are critical to assessing accu-
rately the procedures' effectiveness in decreasing expense and delay, 
thereby increasing the value of the innovative civil justice reform effort. 
Particularly significant, the extension will facilitate RAND's collec-
tion, evaluation, and synthesis of considerably more information on the 
cohort of cases that impose the greatest cost . and delay and, therefore, 
enhance understanding of the procedures' efficacy in expeditiously con-
cluding that litigation which is the most difficult to resolve. 
In short, the one-year extension of the statutory deadline could sub-
stantially increase the worth ·of this novel national experiment with 
expense and delay reduction procedures, even though the modification 
might seem relatively insignificant. The above factors mean that the 
section of the Judicial Amendments Act of 1994 that postpones the 
deadline for completing the study of the pilot districts warrants analy-
sis. This essay undertakes that effort. The paper initially explores the 
developments that prompted Congress to pass legislation extending the 
deadline. I first examine the RAND Corporation's empirical assess-
ment in the ten pilot districts and ascertain that the company's compli-
ance with the mid-1995 date on which it was to have submitted the 
study would have precluded assembling, evaluating, and synthesizing 
considerable instructive material. The essay concomitantly analyzes the 
genesis of this problem and finds that several phenomena, such as some 
pilot districts' delayed implementation of civil justice reform, led to the 
complication but that RAND had no responsibility for, and was una-
ble to affect, the difficulty. 
I next briefly evaluate the 1994 statute's provisions. The paper then 
assesses whether Congress should have granted the extension by exam-
ining the advantages and disadvantages that will probably attend post-
ponement. I ascertain that the benefits will be much greater than the 
detriments, most of which are comparatively unimportant or appear 
amenable to amelioration. The essay thus finds that the congressional 
decision to extend the deadline was appropriate. I conclude with sev-
eral suggestions for efficaciously implementing the postponement that 
the 1994 Judicial Amendments Act affords. 
l. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO PASSAGE OF THE JUDICIAL 
AMENDMENTS ACT 
A. CJRA Statutory Requirements 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 required the Judicial Confer-
1995] CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 107 
ence to select ten pilot districts, at least five of which must encompass 
metropolitan areas. 6 The legislation mandated that, not later than De-
cember 31, 1991, the pilot districts adopt six statutorily-prescribed 
principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay 
reduction; the pilot districts were to experiment with those procedures 
for three years. 7 
The Act commanded that by December 31, 199 5 the Judicial Con-
ference submit a report on the pilot program, including an analysis of 
how much the principles and guidelines decreased expense and delay, 
to the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and of the House of Repre-
sentatives.8 The legislation required that the Conference consider these 
results in light of the effect on cost and delay in ten comparable dis-
tricts that had discretion to promulgate and apply the principles and 
guidelines enumerated in the CJRA.9 This comparison was to be pre-
mised on a study performed by an "independent organization with ex-
pertise in the area of federal court management."10 After soliciting 
proposals, the Judicial Conference selected the RAND Corporation, 
an entity that possesses substantial multidisciplinary experience in civil 
justice research, having conducted numerous evaluations of federal and 
state court procedures and operations.11 The Judicial Conference re-
quested that the RAND Corporation submit the results of its study by 
the middle of 1995, so that the Conference would have sufficient time 
to prepare its report for Congress.12 
The CJRA provided that the Conference's report recommend 
"whether some or all district courts should be required to include" in 
their civil justice plans the prescribed six principles and guidelines.18 If 
the Judicial Conference suggests that some or all districts adopt the 
procedures, the Conference must initiate Federal Rule revision to im-
plement this recommendation.14 Were the Judicial Conference to reject 
the pilot program's expansion, the Conference must "identify alterna-
6. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 
§ 105(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
7. See id. § 105(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prescribing 
principles and guidelines principally governing case management, discovery and ADR). 
8. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(1). 
9. See id. 
10. Id. 
11. See Memorandum of RAND Corporation, Terry Dunworth & James Kakalik, Sum-
mary of Research Design for Evaluation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990 ii, 29-30 (March 18, 1994) (on file with the University of Cincinnati Law Review) 
[hereinafter Summary]. 
12. See id. at 4; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
13. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(2)(A). 
14. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(2)(B). 
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tive, more effective cost and delay reduction programs that should be 
implemented in light of its" report's findings and may commence Fed-
eral Rule amendment to effectuate the suggestion. 111 
The Judicial Conference delegated most of these statutorily-assigned 
responsibilities to the United States Judicial Conference Committee on 
Court Administration and Case Management. That Committee's ini-
tial chair was Robert Parker, then-Chief Judge for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, and the Committee's present chair is Ann Claire Wil-
liams, District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois.16 
Designation of the ten pilot districts was the first action taken by the 
Committee that is relevant to the issues treated in this essay. The only 
requirement that the CJRA imposed on the Conference was that at 
least five of the courts chosen be districts "encompassing metropolitan 
areas."17 The Conference Committee relied on several factors-such as 
filing volume, caseload type, and the relative speed with which districts 
resolved lawsuits-in selecting the Southern District of California, the 
District of Delaware, the Northern District of Georgia, the Southern 
District of New York, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Tennessee, the 
Southern District of Texas, the District of Utah, and the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin. 18 
The Conference principally depended on workload per judge, dis-
trict size, the quantity of civil and criminal filings, and the disposition 
time in civil litigation, as elements for comparing pilot and comparison 
districts. Furthermore, the Conference consulted recommendations 
made by RAND in choosing the ten comparison districts. 19 These are 
the District of Arizona, the Central District of California, the North-
ern District of Florida, the Northern District of Illinois, the Northern 
District of Indiana, the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Western 
District of Kentucky, the District of Maryland, the Eastern District of 
New York, and the Middle District of Pennsylvania.20 
15. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(2)(C). 
16. President Clinton recently appointed Judge Parker to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. See Judicial Milestones, THE THIRD BRANCH, (Admin. Office of the 
U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.) Aug. 1994, at 8. Judge Williams became chair of the Committee in 
October 1993. See Chief Justice Names Judicial Conference Committee Chairs, THE THIRD 
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.) Aug. 1993, at 4-5. 
17. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(b)(2). 
18. See Memorandum from the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations 
on Implementation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 5 Oune, 1994) 
(on file with the University of Cincinnati Law Review) [hereinafter Preliminary Observations). 
19. See id.; see also Summary, supra note 11, at 9-12. 
20. See Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 5. 
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B. The RAND Corporation's Efforts 
The RAND Corporation expeditiously and systematically undertook 
its study of the pilot program. 21 RAND commenced research in Sep-
tember 1991, and the company concentrated on refining its particular 
research design and on assisting the Judicial Conference in designating 
the comparison districts during the initial half-year.22 RAND refined 
the survey questionnaires that it planned to send judges, lawyers, and 
litigants and prepared to field test the questionnaires throughout this 
six-month period and thereafter. 23 RAND researchers also met with 
judicial officers and court personnel in each of the twenty pilot and 
comparison districts to explain the project and to solicit their 
cooperation. 24 
Detailed collection of data began in 1992 and was scheduled to con-
tinue until December 1994. 211 RAND first chose a stratified random 
sample of 250 cases from lawsuits that terminated in each of the 
twenty districts in 1991. RAND then selected a similar sample of cases 
to which courts applied civil justice reform procedures, beginning with 
litigation filed during 1992 and 1993. · 
RAND explained that it was unable to commence this component of 
the study earlier because a number of pilot districts had not completely 
implemented procedures in civil justice expense and delay reducti<,m 
plans until "well into" 1992, even though all of these courts did satisfy 
the December 31, 1991 statutory deadline for adopting plans.26 
RAND proffered several reasons for delayed effectuation, and my 
work and the research of other observers confirm RAND's 
explanations. 
Numerous districts decided to include civil justice reform require-
ments in their local rules, which was an advisable practice because it 
21. I rely substantially in this subsection on Preliminary Observations, supra note 18; 
Memorandum of RAND Corporation, Terry Dunworth & James Kakalik, Supplemental De-
tailed Evaluation of Selected ADR Programs in Selected CJRA Pilot and Comparison Districts, 
Summary of Research Design (October 16, 1992) (on file with the University of Cincinnati 
Law Review) [hereinafter Supplemental], and interviews with RAND and its personnel, em-
ployees of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and others familiar with the RAND 
effort. 
22. See Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4. 
23. See id.; see also Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 19-20 (discussing 
questionnaires). 
24. See Summary, supra note 11, at 14-15. 
25. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 
19-21; Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4. 
26. See Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21 (providing RAND's explanation); 
see also Carl Tobias, judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56 (1992) 
(listing all pilot districts' satisfaction of the deadline); supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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facilitated the access of lawyers and litigants to applicable proce-
dures. 27 Such inclusion meant that the courts had to publish the pro-
posed procedural changes, solicit and consider public input on the pro-
posals, modify them as indicated, formally promulgate the new or 
amended local rules, and notify the bar and the public that the proce-
dures had become effective. 28 
A number of districts encountered complications in implementing 
new procedural requirements. Illustrative is the "difficulty involved in 
instituting a formally structured [Alternative Dispute Resolution] 
ADR plan, which requires developing detailed procedures and forms, 
selecting and certifying ADR providers and informing and educating 
members of the bar about the new program. "29 Even some courts that 
did not experience these types of problems discovered that elaborating 
and effectuating the specifics of new procedures and policies consumed 
considerably more time than Congress or the federal bench had 
contemplated. 30 
RAND planned to track the 5,000 cases being treated with CJRA 
procedures through final disposition or for as long as the statutorily-
imposed deadlines permitted.31 RAND acknowledged that the median 
time for resolving private civil lawsuits has been approximately nine 
months, although courts require much longer to dispose of numerous 
cases.32 RAND's assertions that civil justice reform procedures may 
substantially reduce cost and delay in those lawsuits that presently 
consume the greatest time to process and that probably are most ex-
pensive led it to oversample this group of cases and to state that it must 
27. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1587, 1623 (1994). See generally David S. Day & Margo R. Tschetter, The Local 
Rule Revision Project: The South Dakota Experience, 38 S.D. L. REV. 500 (1993) (examining 
the Uniform Local Rule Revision process in the District of South Dakota as an example of 
beneficial experimentation). 
28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Preliminary Observa-
tions, supra note 18, at 28. For example, compliance with these procedural requirements meant 
that the Montana District's civil justice expense and delay reduction plan only became effective 
on April 1, 1992. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal District, 53 
MONT. L. REV. 239, 239 n.2, 243-244 (1992). 
29. See Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 28. For example, institution of an 
ambitious ADR program in the Western District of Missouri consumed considerable time. See 
Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Western District of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335, 
341-42 (1993). 
30. Quite a few districts also had to expend time employing and training new personnel to 
adopt, implement, and evaluate the reform procedures. Indeed, as late as June 1994, RAND 
found that there were "even a few circumstances under which some plan provisions have still 
not yet been implemented." Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 28. 
31. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21. 
32. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21; Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4. 
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collect data for three years. 33 RAND admonished that a "significant 
and troublesome proportion of the CJRA case sample will still be open 
when, under the present timetable, data collection must end at the 
close of 1994."34 
The RAND Corporation's early prognostication proved to be cor-
rect. By 1994, it became clear that an important percentage of the 
cases that RAND was tracking would not be completed in time to per-
mit their inclusion in the RAND study. The Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts, one research and data collection component 
of the federal courts that has significant responsibility for helping to 
implement and evaluate the CJRA, requested that RAND compile a 
report thoroughly explaining this problem. 311 
RAND relied upon the districts' histories of resolving litigation over 
the last two decades and projected into the future by case types. 36 Were 
it to mainta'in the original schedule, RAND found that the average 
percentage of lawsuits which would remain unresolved when its study 
was scheduled to end would be twenty percent, a number of districts 
would have greater than thirty percent, and the loss of some specific 
categories of litigation would exceed forty percent. 37 The above per-
centages were not uniformly distributed either across districts or case 
types.38 It is important to emphasize that many of these suits are the 
very ones that require the greatest time and resources to conclude and 
on which civil justice reform procedures could have the most profound 
effects. 
When Judge Williams read the report that the Administrative Office 
asked RAND to compile, she found that an extension was clearly war-
ranted and desirable. In the spring of 1994, Judge Williams wrote 
Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and 
the CJRA's principal proponent, suggesting the propriety of postpone-
ment. 39 This correspondence, however, elicited no written response, 
33. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21; Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4. 
RAND asserted that, over the three-year time, experience will probably lead districts to im-
prove and modify policies and that it would be important to reflect those improvements in the 
report to Congress. Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4. 
34. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21. 
35. This assertion is premised on conversations with RAND personnel, Administrative 
Office employees, and other individuals who are knowledgeable about civil justice reform. 
36. Telephone Interview with Terence Dunworth, Principal Researcher, RAND Corpora-
tion O uly 11, 1994) [hereinafter Telephone Interview]. 
37. Id. 
38. For instance, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which quickly instituted its reform 
effort, is projected to have only a three percent loss. Telephone Interview, supra note 36. 
39. Letter from Ann Claire Williams, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Illinois, to 
Senator Joseph Biden, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 13, 1994). 
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even though the Senator's staff began working on possible solutions."0 
When the Case Management Committee met on June 21, 1994, it offi-
cially considered the issue for the first time and unanimously voted to 
request that Congress extend the relevant deadlines.0 
The Committee asked Judge Williams to write another letter in-
forming Senator Biden of the Committee's action and requesting him 
to sponsor legislation that would extend those deadlines. •2 The neces-
sity for that correspondence was obviated, however, when it became 
clear that several prominent members of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, including Senator Biden, intended to introduce a bill that would 
address this matter during the summer of 1994. •s 
II. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM 
Several factors apparently explain why so many cases would have 
remained unresolved when RAND was scheduled to complete its 
study. One important consideration is that the statute initially provided 
insufficient time for the litigation in which CJRA procedures were be-
ing applied to conclude and for RAND to assemble, analyze, and syn-
thesize all of the relevant data.•• Earlier experimentation with similar 
reforms in states, such as California and New Jersey, suggested that 
the time prescribed in the 1990 legislation for experimentation with 
procedures and for assessment would probably prove inadequate."11 
This was particularly true of the complex suits, which require the 
greatest money and time to resolve and for which RAND oversampled, 
even though these cases are critical to the most accurate evaluation of 
the efficacy of civil justice reform procedures. 
Another significant factor was numerous pilot districts' delay in fully 
instituting expense and delay reduction procedures for reasons re-
counted above, such as the need to promulgate new local rules."6 Some-
40. Telephone Interview with Sean Moylan, Counsel, United States Senate Judiciary 
Committee Ouly 11, 1994). 
41. This is premised on telephone interviews with several individuals who are familiar 
with that meeting. 
42. This is premised on telephone interviews with several individuals who are familiar 
with that meeting. 
43. See S. 2407, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also infra notes 48-51 and accompanying 
text. 
44. Telephone interview, supra note 36; see also TERENCE DUNWORTH & NICHOLAS M. 
PACE, RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FED-
ERAL COURTS (1990); supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
45. This assertion is premised on telephone interviews with numerous individuals who are 
knowledgeable about federal and state civil justice reform efforts. 
46. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
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what slow implementation meant that districts failed to apply proce-
dures immediately upon the adoption of civil justice plans, that RAND 
could not begin selecting all relevant suits for tracking on January 1, 
1992, that a number of suits designated were filed throughout 1992, 
and that some of the litigation chosen was instituted as late as 1993. •7 
Delayed effectuation also explains why so many lawsuits would have 
terminated after the study's scheduled completion date. 
It is clear, however, that RAND had no responsibility for, and could 
have done little to affect, the problems that arose. The Judicial Con-
ference selected RAND to conduct the study many months after Con-
gress passed the CJRA, so that RAND obviously did not participate in 
the decisionmaking that established the statutory deadlines. RAND 
was similarly uninvolved in, and unable to influence, the delays that 
pilot districts experienced when implementing civil justice reform. 
The RAND Corporation apparently did all that it could to comply 
with the legislative deadline. As soon as the Judicial Conference chose 
RAND to perform the assessment, the company promptly and effec-
tively instituted the study. Since the evaluation's initiation, RAND 
seems to have done all possible to conduct the analysis expeditiously 
and effectively. 
Ill. THE JUDICIAL AMENDMENTS ACT 
The specific statutory section that provides the extension warrants 
relatively limited treatment here because the provision is rather terse 
and straightforward and its passage was relatively uncontroversial. 
Five members of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced the Judi-
cial Amendments Act of 1994 on August 18, while Congress was bat-
tling over the crime bill, health care reform, and rushing toward its 
Labor Day recess."8 Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), Committee 
Chair, Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.), Courts Subcommittee Chair, 
and Senators Charles Grassley (R-lowa), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and 
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), ranking minority members of the Committee, 
sponsored the legislation which passed that day and was sent to the 
House of Representatives.49 
On October 7, the House enacted the bill as received following polit-
ical machinations in which prominent members of the House Judiciary 
Committee attempted to insert provisions, governing topics such as au-
47. Telephone interview, supra note 36. 
48. See S. 2407, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also 140 CONG. REC. S12104 (1994). 
49. See 140 CoNG. REC. S12104, S12106 (1994) (statement of Senator Grassley); Judicial 
Amendments Act of 1994, 140 CONG. REC. Hll,295-96 (1994). 
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thorization to build additional federal courthouses, that they favored. 60 
At the eleventh hour, common sense apparently prevailed, and Con-
gress passed this measure extending three p~ograms that are important 
to the operations of the federal courts. 61 
The legislation simply postpones for one year the date on which the 
Judicial Conference must report to Congress. This means that RAND 
has an additional year in which to complete its study and tender the 
results to the Conference. The ten pilot and ten comparison districts, 
therefore, must retain and continue applying the six principles and 
guidelines for another year, while lawyers and parties litigating in 
those courts must continue complying with those requirements. The 
twenty districts must also continue working with RAND to facilitate 
its evaluation of these procedures. · 
IV. BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXTENDING THE 
STATUTORY DEADLINE 
A Benefits 
Many important advantages will accrue from extension of the statu-
tory deadline. Most significant will be the ability to capture considera-
bly more data, which leads to more accurate determinations about pre-
cisely how much specific procedures reduce expense or delay and 
provides better information on which to base policy decisions regarding 
the mechanisms' application. These factors are especially true of the 
cases that are most protracted and expensive and of the procedures that 
ostensibly have the largest potential to save money or time in those 
lawsuits. 
Postponing the deadline is apparently preferable for nearly all indi-
viduals, interests, and institutions-including Congress and federal 
court judges, lawyers, and litigants who have participated in the civil 
justice reform enterprise to date and who will be involved in future 
efforts to improve federal civil litigation. Practically everyone, includ-
ing proponents and critics of the Act and its implementation, will 
profit from having the maximum available valid data on the principles 
and guidelines and their ability to decrease cost and delay. 
It would also be wasteful, having devoted such substantial energy, 
50. See 140 CoNG. REC. Hll,295, 11,296 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994). This information is 
premised on conversations with individuals who are familiar with the developments that 
transpired. 
51. See Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, 108 Stat. 4345 (1994); 
see also supra note 5. 
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time, and resources to experimentation thus far, to not capture a sig-
nificantly greater quantity of, and more accurate, information. Indeed, 
one important reason why so much controversy attended the CJRA's 
passage was that no one possessed sufficient data on specific procedures 
and their effectiveness in limiting expense or delay to justify national 
application. The failure to continue experimentation with, and evalua-
tion of, the principles and guidelines for another year risks reverting to 
the earlier situation in which inadequate information was available 
about the efficacy of particular measures to warrant reliance on them. 
Extension of the deadline seems evenhanded in numerous other 
ways. It now appears that postponement will simply yield greater data 
and more accurate assessments of the specific principles and guidelines. 
Insofar as projections can be made, an extension will not prejudice in 
any meaningful way the evaluation of procedural efficacy. Moreover, 
postponement seems unlikely to have much positive or negative impact 
as between Congress and the federal judiciary, as well as on advocates 
and opponents of the 1990 legislation and federal court judges, law-
yers, and litigants. 
Extension will not require that the budget-conscious Congress ap-
propriate additional resources. The only increased cost of RAND's ef-
forts will be a four percent inflationary factor, which the Administra-
tive Office is prepared to absorb out of previously allocated CJRA 
funds. 112 Postponing the deadline concomitantly effects few changes in 
the scope of the requirements that the statute imposes on federal dis-
tricts or the work that the courts agreed to do with RAND. Further-
more, extension jeopardizes no congressional prerogatives regarding 
civil justice reform. The 1997 date on which the Act is scheduled to 
sunset means that the postponement will actually afford Congress 
greater time to plan for the receipt of, and to respond in ways that it 
deems appropriate to, the RAND study results and the Judicial Con-
ference Report and recommendation. 113 
Extension will also provide some ancillary benefits. For example, it 
should enable judges, attorneys, and parties to experiment for a longer 
period with ostensibly effective procedures. Postponement will corre-
spondingly accord the Judicial Conference an opportunity to become 
even better informed about the reform and to prepare for receipt of the 
RAND study so that the Conference can tender the most helpful re-
port to Congress. Congress should similarly be able to capitalize on 
this additional time to increase legislative appreciation of civil justice 
52. Telephone interview, supra note 36. 
53. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 
§ 103(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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reform experimentation and its evaluation and to plan for the RAND 
analysis and the Judicial Conference report. These congressional en-
deavors will concomitantly facilitate expeditious, careful consideration 
of the RAND study and of the Conference report, which assumes pe-
culiar significance in light of the imminent 1997 date on which Con-
gress must decide whether the CJRA will sunset.114 
B. Disadvantages 
The disadvantages that the extension will impose are relatively few 
in number and rather inconsequential. Furthermore, most are amena-
ble to amelioration. Some pilot and comparison districts may be incon-
venienced by postponement or may even wish to cease experimentation. 
For another year, judges in these twenty districts must continue enforc-
ing the principles and guidelines, while lawyers and litigants will have 
to find, understand, and comply with the requirements. 1111 Because most 
of these procedures apply comparatively early in the pretrial process, 
they could have somewhat limited relevance to that cohort of cases 
awaiting resolution and evaluation by RAND. Moreover, the exten-
sion will effectively preclude the Judicial Conference from recom-
mending experimentation with principles and guidelines in additional 
federal districts because the one-year postponement affords insufficient 
time to implement the procedures unless Congress extends the date on 
which the CJRA sunsets.116 
C. Resolution 
Both the quantity and quality of benefits that will apparently result 
from postponement outweigh the disadvantages, most of which can be 
remedied or ameliorated. For example, the extension will enhance the 
validity of the study's methodology, the evaluation's integrity, the thor-
oughness of the information gleaned, and the conclusions derived from 
those data. Furthermore, the extension will lead to more well-informed 
procedural decisionmaking in the future. Congressional passage of the 
legislation that postponed the deadline for a year, therefore, was 
advisable. 
54. The extension contracts to less than a year the time that Congress has to decide 
whether the CJRA will sunset. See supra note 53. 
55. Because procedures adopted in some of the districts are difficult to locate, comprehend, 
and reconcile with the Federal Rules, they can complicate practice, especially for attorneys and 
parties who litigate in multiple districts and who may prefer the uniform Federal Rules. See 
Tobias, supra note 1, at 1422-27. 
56. See supra notes 13-14, 53 and accompanying text. 
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V. SUGGESTIONS 
Recommendations for efficaciously implementing the statutory ex-
tension require relatively little examination here, because the provision 
for postponement is comparatively straightforward and should be 
rather easy to effectuate. The RAND Corporation must capitalize on 
the additional year that the extension affords to gather, assess, and 
synthesize the maximum possible relevant material on the principles 
and guidelines that the pilot and comparison courts are applying. 
RAND should continue collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing perti-
nent data and working with the twenty districts as conscientiously as 
the company apparently has to date. 117 
The ten pilot and comparison courts and the federal judges in these 
districts should keep cooperating with RAND to facilitate its effective 
evaluation of the procedures. The courts must also retain and continue 
to apply the principles and guidelines while taking advantage of the 
extra year to experiment with and refine promising mechanisms for 
reducing expense and delay. Lawyers and parties litigating in these 
districts should attempt to make the procedures work effectively, even 
as they freely criticize measures that fail to yield cost or time savings. 
Judges, attorneys, and parties must cooperate with RAND by, for in-
stance, carefully answering any questionnaires regarding the CJRA 
that the company circulates to them. 118 
The Judicial Conference should employ the year to increase its un-
derstanding of reform efforts and to anticipate the submission of the 
RAND study, thereby enabling the Conference to compile a report ·for 
Congress that will best assist the lawmakers. For example, the Confer-
ence may want to formulate alternative procedures should the RAND 
analysis eventually indicate that this option is preferable to more fed-
eral districts' application of the statutorily-prescribed principles and 
57. Any effort to predict what the RAND study will ultimately show is premature and 
fraught with difficulty. A number of the federal districts that are not pilot courts have only been 
experimenting for less than two years. Moreover, the RAND Corporation is providing the only 
rigorous evaluation of procedures applied in the pilot districts and has reached no conclusions 
yet. Nevertheless, it is possible to posit very tentative predictions based upon experimentation 
and analysis. For instance, substantial reliance can be placed on annual assessments that numer-
ous districts have performed. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF GEORGIA, ANNUAL AsSESSMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE COURT'S DOCKET (1993); 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DoCKET (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1988 & Supp. V 1'993). This 
evaluation suggests that some procedures in the broad areas of judicial case management, discov-
ery, and ADR will probably reduce expense and delay. See Tobias, supra note 27, at 1623. 
Congress chose to delay similar evaluation of the Demonstration Program that the Federal Ju-
dicial Center is conducting. S. 464, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
58. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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guidelines. lie Congress should concomitantly use the extra year to en-
hance its comprehension of civil justice reform. For instance, Congress 
could continue to monitor experimentation and evaluation in preparing 
for the receipt of the Judicial Conference report and in responding to 
it when determining whether the CJRA should sunset.60 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 instituted unprecedented self-
analysis in the federal district courts, which led to experimei;itation 
with procedures for decreasing cost and delay in civil litigation. Con-
gress wisely decided to extend for a year the comprehensive assessment 
of that experimentation, which the RAND Corporation is conducting. 
The postponement should enhance the value of experimentation by fa-
cilitating the collection, evaluation, and synthesis of greater, more accu-
rate information on these innovative efforts to save money and time. 
59. It is more difficult to predict what the Conference will do because its report and rec-
ommendation will probably be premised substantially on the results of the RAND study. See 
supra note 57. Moreover, the extension has effectively precluded prescription of experimentation 
with principles and guidelines in additional districts, unless Congress extends the date on which 
the CJRA sunsets. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 13-15 and 
accompanying text. 
60. It is even more difficult to predict what Congress will do. Completion of the RAND 
study and of the Judicial Conference report and recommendation to Congress premised on that 
study must first occur. Prediction is additionally complicated because of the political machina-
tions that may attend congressional decisionmaking on whether the CJRA should sunset. In any 
event, Congress should probably exercise caution in reaching this determination. After all, Con-
gress was substantially responsible for the need to postpone the deadline, even though it wisely 
decided to grant an extension. 
